

Review

The challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa

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Regional integration is increasingly being accepted as essential in facilitating economic and political development. Yet dominant development theories informing policy have yet to integrate 'integration theory' into their models. In Southern Africa, the attempt to achieve regional integration using 'disintegrative' development models has led to paralysis and pain. This paper highlights this contradiction and shows that regional integration presupposes complementary economic policies and productive structures. Economic nationalism and the mono-cultural production of raw materials militate against regional integration and this explains why in Southern Africa there is so much inertia but little progress.

Keywords: Regional integration, economic development, political development, productive structures.

INTRODUCTION

Regional integration has manifested itself historically in Africa, America and Europe as bureaucratic efforts at political unification and capital expansion. In Southern Africa, it has taken the institutional form of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was formed in 1992 (Johnson, 2004), and which superseded the 1980 founded Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC). Formed against a background of poverty and economic backwardness, SADC evolved in a context of political turmoil and instability in the sub-region. The wars of liberation produced refugees and engendered considerable economic destruction, while the stalled transformations have led to frustration and resentment.

The main objective of SADC is to promote 'economic and social development through co-operation and integration...the next logical step after independence' (SADC, 2002, p. 2). Economic integration seeks to achieve self-sustaining development, economic growth, the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of resources management and the achievement of sustainable utilisation of natural resources (SADC Treaty, art 5(1) (a, b, g, l,)). Today regional integration is also expected to strengthen peace and security and to involve not only states, but civil society and industry as well. The African

Union (AU) has "identified economic cooperation and integration as the engine to propel African development" (Ginkel et al., 2003, p. 1) and regional economic communities, such as SADC, as pillars for continental integration and development.

This analysis traces the evolution of SADC and identifies some of the actors and factors that have both induced and inhibited integration in the sub-region. It argues that the less than satisfactory progress in regional integration is due to a combination of factors that include poor economic and political governance, nationalist rivalry, mono-cultural agro-based economies, debt and dependency on the West, lack of financial and technical resources and institutional incapacity. The end of the Cold War and the advent of a uni-polar (or is it non-polar or multi-polar?) world, as well as globalisation have increased the dilemmas and challenges of regional integration. Finally, the failure to adequately address certain 'conceptual, strategic and practical problems' by SADC (Davies, 1996) has contributed to poor performance. However, in spite of these problems, there is great scope and potential for regional integration in the sub-region.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS CONCEPT, PROCESS AND CONDITION

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Subject to various interpretations, region is far from a

clearly defined entity and its particular connotations have varied greatly over history and across cultural contexts. Regions can be defined variously by geography, economic interaction, institutional or governmental jurisdiction, or by social and cultural characteristics (UNU/CRIS and Allied Consultants, 2002). In a sense, trying to define integration is like asking blind men to describe an elephant; each one will come up with a different definition, depending on the part of the elephant they are holding. There is neither a clear definition of integration nor consensus on its substantive content and form, let alone agreement on paradigms that should inform it. Different paradigms and theories vie for supremacy and are presented as the best approaches by their advocates. The lack of clarity and consensus on the guiding paradigm for regional integration and how to achieve it is perhaps one of the key explanatory factors for limited progress.

In general, integration is the unification of a number of hitherto independent units into a larger whole, which is 'more than the sum of its parts'. Integration can be conceived of as a process (dynamic), terminal condition (static) or combination of both. As a process, integration involves the establishment of common legal rules and legal systems for citizens (Bach, 2000). As an outcome, integration in Southern Africa has taken the form of bureaucratic and political institutionalisation, while as a process it has involved development from a state of isolation to a condition of unification and incorporation. Integration also occurs at various levels of society (local, national, regional and international) and takes economic, social and political forms and its success or failure is determined by the interaction of enabling and inhibiting variables.

THE RATIONALE FOR INTEGRATION

The merits of regional integration are obvious. From a global perspective, African states are not strong enough to survive in the world market on their own. Militarily weak, African countries cannot defend themselves and therefore have to belong to a regional group in order to increase their clout and ensure their security. As Hettne et al. (1999) point out, in order to counter the effects of a turbulent global political and economic system and especially to arrest their marginalisation, developing countries need to integrate their national political and economic systems. In a similar vein, Davies (1996; 2) argues:

There is a general recognition that the real question [is] not whether there should be co-operation or integration, but rather to identify that combination of co-operation, coordination and integration, that [is] realistic and feasible under prevailing conditions, and that could thus best advance the goals of contributing to growth and development.

Regional integration discourse assumes that neighbouring countries that have similar economic, socio-political and security problems may benefit from integrating their economies because this creates a situation of mutual inter-dependence and development. Also countries may need regional integration arrangements even if they do not have similar problems. Regional integration creates larger economic spaces and allows for economy of scale, which may increase efficiency, competitiveness and faster growth.

Indeed a number of studies commissioned by regional organizations (SADCC, 1992; SADC, 1993), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Africa Development Bank (ADB, 1993) conclude that "all Southern African Region (SAR) countries have much to gain from various forms of regional co-operation and from launching a determined effort to integrate the regional market (Davies, 1996; 2). A 1993 study undertaken by the ADB on economic integration in Southern Africa identifies three welfare gains that can be achieved by regional integration as substantial cost savings that arise from institutional infrastructure integration, externalities which increase competition thereby generating a range of diversified products, and improved production techniques and skills that lead to lower cost and more attractive opportunities for the future growth of SADC (ADB, 1993). Accordingly, SADC has adopted the Regional Indicative Strategic and Development Plan (RISDP0) as both a blueprint and vehicle for regional integration, and in order to promote peace and security it has set up the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO).

The major rationale for regional integration is the belief that there is strength in numbers and in unity and that this strength can speed up the pace of development as well as enhance security. Co-operation and integration are a strategy for overcoming perceived weaknesses and development obstacles. However, as the experience of Southern Africa suggests, regional co-operation and integration do not always lead to peace nor to development. Contrary to the dominant discourses, efforts at regional integration may generate conflicts and tensions within and between states, especially when opposing ideological and political systems are involved or when the economic benefits of integration are perceived to be uneven.

Regional integration also has costs. Among others, these include interference in internal affairs, which may compromise sovereignty. The pressure and obligation to conform to the values, principles and protocols of the regional grouping may also negatively affect domestic policy. Similarly, payment of membership fees may be a burden to the tax payer of impoverished member states. Finally, in the event of violent conflict in a member country, member states may pay with the lives of their citizens, for example as happened for Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe during the DRC conflict. In general,

however, the benefits of integration must exceed the costs for membership to a regional grouping to be attractive.

THE HISTORY OF INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In Europe, North America and Asia, regional integration has been premised on functionality and in spite of its shortcomings, it still animates many as evidenced by the proliferation of regional organizations. Similarly, in Southern Africa, the history of the idea of regional integration dates back to the ancient empires of Monomotapa and Chaka the Zulu. Though based on coercion, these ancients recognised the benefits of large markets and bigger populations in fostering economic development, prosperity and consolidation of power. The ever-expanding Monomotapa Empire covered much of contemporary Zimbabwe, Western Mozambique and parts of Northern South Africa and until his sudden death, Chaka's empire was rapidly expanding through warfare and absorption of weaker kingdoms.

In modern times the cause for regional integration in Southern Africa was given impetus by the region's tortuous history of anti-colonial struggle that caused considerable economic destruction, displacement and refugees. The anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle, which pitted the majority Blacks against minority White domination, led to the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) in the 1970s, the original members of which were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Cilliers, 1999). The FLS supported liberation movements in the sub-region and with the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia, its members formed the SADCC.

The objectives of SADCC were first outlined at a summit in Lusaka in 1980, where the Black ruled states of Southern Africa – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - declared their "commitment to policies aimed at economic liberation on the basis of sustainable integrated development of the economies" (www.SADC.org). In Windhoek in 1992, the Heads of States and Government signed a treaty transforming 'SADCC from a coordination conference into Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC), and redefined the basis of co-operation of member states from a loose association into a legally binding arrangement (www.SADC.org).

SADC departs from the vaguely conceived objective of co-operation present in its predecessor and envisages a broader context of interaction, seeking to achieve economic, social and political integration. In March 2001 SADC adopted a more explicit common agenda that entailed restructuring SADC institutions and embraced market integration and development, facilitation and promotion of trade and investment and variable geometry (different

arrangements at various levels of integration applying to different groups of countries within the group). In short, SADC's Common agenda is to:

- i. Promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty eradication.
- ii. Promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through democratic, legitimate and effective institutions.
- iii. Consolidate democracy, peace and security. SADC has now adopted a more centralised approach, and the 21 Coordinating Units have been grouped into four clusters, namely: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes.

SADC is struggling to translate these objectives into practical possibility, and towards this endeavour it has set up a number of institutions and organs. In view of the huge economic disparities between member states, SADC has also identified areas that require co-operation, co-ordination and integration at a local, national and regional level.

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SADC SUB-REGION

SADC consists of 14 countries, has a total population of approximately 200 - 210 million people and covers an area of 9.1 km². Agriculture is the backbone of the SADC regional economy. This is problematic for it is industry that is the true engine of regional development that generates growth, jobs and wealth. Agriculture contributes 35% to gross domestic product of the SADC economy, 13% to total export earnings, 66% to the value of intra-regional trade and about 70% of the SADC population depends on agriculture for food, income and employment (Economic and Social Research Foundation, ESRF, 2003). SADC countries also have a vast and diversified mineral resource base, which includes precious and base metals, industrial minerals and precious stones.

Three countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa and Tanzania account for almost two thirds of the total population (64.4%), while the other six smallest members (Seychelles, Swaziland, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho) comprise only 4% of the total population. South Africa is the dominant economy and it accounts for about 70 - 80% of the SADC GDP and approximately 22% of its population. Without South Africa, SADC had a total GDP of around US\$ 30 billion in 1993; South Africa's overall GDP stood at US\$ 120 billion, representing 80% of the total. In 2000 the total SADC GDP was around US\$182 billion and during

2000 and 2001 SADC imports accounted for 13% of total market share, while exports accounted for 4% (ESRF, 2003).

Seven of the SADC countries, Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are classified as highly indebted and least-developed economies (ESRF, 2003). Indebted, poor and faced with food shortages, SADC has adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food security that sets priority areas and considers the establishment of a regional agriculture development facility, as well as a regional food reserve facility capable of providing disaster relief (Kritzinger-van Niekerk, 2002; SADC Secretariat, 2003).

Almost all of the SADC countries depend on South Africa's railways, port (airports and seaports), high ways and other transit facilities. South Africa exports far more to the SADC region than it imports. The levels of imports and exports differ from country to country. For example, Tanzania imports far more than it exports to SADC countries. Similarly, while South African imports from Mozambique have declined by more than 33% per year, soybean imports from Malawi grew by 88%. In general, trade between SADC member countries has been rising recently, with Zambia importing various agricultural products from SADC member countries (ESRF, 2003). With the end of apartheid and the subsequent democratic transition, South Africa has made a great transformation from being the greatest conflict area to being the greatest peace-maker in Africa and its joining of SADC was expected to boost the organization's capacity.

SOUTH AFRICA IN SADC

The establishment and subsequent expansion of capital in Southern Africa was such that South Africa became the powerhouse of the regional economy, with the other economies primarily providing labour for its mining industry. Mozambique provided 'Black gold' (mine workers) while Lesotho and Swaziland remained extensions of the South African economy. During the 1980s, apartheid South Africa had been a major cause of political, economic and military destabilization in the region and indeed the Front Line States (FLS) and SADCC were formed mainly to resist and challenge South African destabilisation and hegemony.

The 1994 elections in South Africa that brought the Mandela-led ANC government into power marked an important turning point in the history of Southern Africa. South Africa's accession to the SADC Treaty in August 1994 – 4 months after the elections – generated "high expectations in some quarters that the country's entry into regional organizations would be a major catalytic event driving a process of regional co-operation and integration forward" (Davies, 1996; 1). But, on the other hand, sceptics "argued that preoccupation with domestic problems would lead to the sidelining of regional issues

by a democratic South African government" (Davies, 1996; 1). Indeed South African opposition parties accuse the government of spending too much on foreign peacekeeping missions at the expense of local development, while other African countries complain of lack of sufficient commitment to the continent's problems.

More than a decade after South Africa became a member of SADC, it is clear that the high expectations were rather misplaced just as the fears of a parochially nationalist approach were exaggerated. There has neither been a great leap towards a more integrated region, nor has South Africa completely turned its back on the region (Davis, 1996; 1). Instead, there has been limited progress characterized by the signing of protocols and agreements that are hardly implemented. Like other members of the grouping, South Africa is faced with enormous internal problems of poverty, landlessness and unemployment and if these are not addressed the country could degenerate into apartheid era restlessness and violence.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

A broad and contested concept, political integration refers to a fundamental transformation of a political architecture (UNI/CRIS and Allied Consultants, 2002), such as the formation of new political entities or the further development of existing ones. In its deeper form, political integration involves the constitution of new political entities that are sovereign and independent (GROOM, 2000). Membership of a regional integration arrangement is thus fundamentally a political decision that is based on political, social and geographical as well as economic considerations (<http://www.sarpn.org.za/rpp/trade.php>).

The political objectives of regional integration range from promoting common political values and systems, strengthening legitimate and democratic institutions and consolidating peace, security and stability. In southern Africa, political integration involves the establishment of shared values and norms that guide the goals of regional co-operation and development (IDASA, 2004). These norms and values are embodied in the agreements, declarations and protocols that cover a wide range of economic and social sectors, such as SADC's recent protocol on Elections and Democracy.

Political integration has both an institutional and normative aspect (UNI/CRIS and Allied Consultants, 2002). Institutionally, integration should strengthen political systems, expand their scope and enhance capacity for decision-making, while normatively, integration is the creation of supranational institutions (IDASA, 2004), norms and values. Finally, political integration presupposes that the collective impact in international politics is large enough to influence decisions in their favour or at least leave them at, what DKD Zormelo has termed, a '*Pareto optimum*' position (Zormelo, 1995, p. 35; Kिलlick, 1981, p. 40; Taylor, 1990). In an endeavour to enhance

capacity for decision-making and expedite political integration SADC has set up a number of institutions and these include the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) and the SADC National Committee.)

Comprised of at least two ministers from each member state, the ICM guides policy, coordination and harmonisation of cross-sectoral activities. The SADC National Committee provides input at the national level in the formulation of regional policies and strategies. The SADC National Committee has established a Strategic Plan of Action (SPA) which co-ordinates and oversees the implementation of these programmes at the national level. In 2001 SPA had 407 projects, with an estimated cost of US \$ 8.09 billion, designed to realise the overall goals of SADC. SPA has also developed several protocols in the following: shared watercourse systems, energy, combating illicit drug trafficking, transport, communication and meteorology, education and training, mining, immunities and privileges, health, wildlife conservation and law enforcement and tribunal and legal affairs.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Economic integration also known as market integration, is the process by which the economic barriers against exchange of goods, services, capital and people between two or more countries are eliminated or reduced (UNU/CRIS and Consultants, 2002; Mutai, 2003; p. 16). Economic integration starts with a Preferential Trade Area (PTA), moves to a Free Trade Area (FTA), to a customs union and common markets and ends with an economic and political union (Davis, 1996; UNU/CRIS and Consultants, 2002). SADC is planning to establish a free trade area by 2008, a customs union by 2012 and a common market by 2015, under which all products traded in the region will be duty-free and factors of production will move freely across the region. Currently estimated at 24% of total trade and lauded as the highest on the African continent (Gabotlale, 2004), intra-regional trade is projected to increase to 35% (Ramsamy, 2003).

Economic integration within SADC is expected to contribute towards gradual structural change and economic development (Nyarabu, 2004, p. 23) and to market integration, which then leads to large markets and economies of scale. Economies of scale enable countries in an integration scheme to specialise and develop sufficient productive capacity to compete (Landsberg, 2002). By allowing some of the domestic production to be replaced by intra-regional imports, economic integration encourages specialisation, improves resource allocation and enhances industrialisation through joint production of goods and services, as well as protection against adverse developments in world markets (Grugel and Hout, 1999). Thus, while setting up an airbus manufacturing plant in a minuscule economy, such as Lesotho, may be almost impossible because the local revenue

base and market are too small to accommodate such large-scale investment, within a fully integrated regional economy this would be feasible.

As part of a division of labour meant to promote regional integration, each SADC member state has been allocated the responsibility of coordinating one or more sectors and this should facilitate resolving national problems through regional action. Premised on an expectation of gains from integration that can be derived from the so-called dynamic 'spill-over effects', which according to (Zormelo, 1995; 46), include industrialisation, increased bargaining power in international trade and economies of large-scale production, the integration projects of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC (Johnson, 2004), have had to contend with immobilising, unexpected losses.

With the aim of avoiding such losses and to provide strategic direction for its economic integration objectives, SADC adopted a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003, a 15-year plan to be implemented in phases of three years. The plan seeks to realign the integration agenda with the objectives of internationally agreed millennium development goals, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). RISDP reaffirms the commitment of SADC member states to good political, economic and corporate governance, a culture of democracy, full participation by civil society, transparency, respect for the rule of law and poverty eradication.

Although not officially recognized nor incorporated into the RISDP, informal economic integration is perhaps proceeding at a much faster pace than formal economic integration. In Johannesburg and Cape Town for example, informal traders, coming from all over Africa and with goods ranging from woodcarvings, sculpture, clothes, drums and music, are a major part of economic life. In Cape Town quite a few foreigners are self-employed in activities that range from 'street wire' to food and beverages and this has certainly enriched the social space of the city. Unrecorded cross border trade in Southern Africa is quite significant and should beat that of the ECOWAS region, which is between 20% and 25% (Economic Commission for Africa, ECA, 2003, 40); similarly, the unrecorded trade between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, like that between Ghana and Togo, should be significantly higher than the official trade. Indeed, these traders, some of them economic refugees, are on the frontier of economic and cultural integration, yet the authorities constantly harass them. A large part of the unrecorded regional trade in Africa is due to informal sector activities.

SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION

At one level, Southern African countries have a common history and tradition that transcends national borders in

the region. This history includes pre-colonial warfare, colonialism and the subsequent subjugation of indigenous Black people by invading White settlers. In recognition of this common cultural history and destiny, SADC established the Sector for Culture, Information and Sport in 1992. The sector was established to provide SADC with a socio-cultural framework of integration that would facilitate people's involvement in the process of regional integration (www.sadc.org).

Integration in the socio-cultural sector is a form of development cooperation in which different cultures and societies meet and interact. Productive interaction and cooperation between people from different cultures require mutual understanding and communication that are based on respect for difference and diversity as well as for human rights. As articulated in the SADC Treaty, the social objectives of regional integration are: building support mechanisms for the socially disadvantaged in the region, consolidation of the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the SADC region, the effective protection of the environment, the combating of HIV/Aids and other deadly communicable diseases and gender mainstreaming (Kaime, 2004, p.110). Such socio-cultural integration thrives and develops through cultural interpenetration and co-operation based on the knowledge, experience and skills of the SADC population.

Areas of manifest cultural integration are music and inter-marriage. In urban South Africa, music and musicians from other African countries are very popular and receive generous airplay time on South African Broadcasting (SABC) stations. Some of these cultural and musical forms are being innovatively appropriated and integrated into local culture by Southern African youth. Such forms of social engagement and interaction are essential in forging a sense of common purpose, regional identity and promoting peace and stability.

PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

One major obstacle to regional integration has been conflict between nations, especially between neighbours. Until the end of apartheid in SA in 1994, Southern Africa had been a cauldron of violent conflict, pitting the White racist minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa against the Black majority. In endeavour to promote peace and security as essential ingredients of regional integration, in 1993 SADC established the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS), a common security regime whose functions include the prevention and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts. The organ has a well-defined structure and reporting lines that should allow SADC to play an enhanced role in regional conflict management and to safeguard peace and security in the region.

The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) has

been developed to assist with conflict resolution and to operationalise the objectives of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Critical to the management of the Organ is the Organ Troika, which is made up of three member states, the current, incoming and the outgoing Chair. Since its inception, the Organ has been bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states. Nationalist rivalry, especially competition and animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe, almost paralysed the Organ and led to disagreements over its status and structure (Nathan, 2004).

The adoption of the OPDS led to the creation of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) in 1995 (Cilliers, 1999). SARPCCO is the primary operational mechanism in Southern Africa for the prevention and fighting of cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons. By becoming its *de facto* sub regional operational arm (Jakkie, 1999), SARPCCO has become an important asset in the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). However, for Nathan (2003; 1), the "challenge of common security in Southern Africa is less a regional than a national challenge", for the main problems are national and "cannot be solved at the regional level".

In a fully integrated region, people, goods and services are able to cross national borders freely. However, in Southern Africa and in spite of the many protocols and institutions, hitherto neither citizens of the region interact freely nor is it easy to cross the borders. On the contrary, xenophobia is on the rise, and the immigration regime, of South Africa in particular, is increasingly becoming restrictive and discriminatory. A new form of 'post-apartheid apartheid' is emerging in which it is far easier for citizens from Western countries that supported apartheid to enter the new South Africa while it is not as easy for citizens from African countries that supported the anti-apartheid struggle to enter the country. The supposed developmental benefits of regional integration, deriving from economies of scale, larger markets and division of labour, are still to materialise. In short, efforts at regional integration face many challenges and with the exception of the defence and security sector, the level of institutionalization remains low.

THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Hitherto SADC's spectacular achievement has been in signing of agreements, protocols and treaties amidst pomp, wine and dining in luxury hotels. As of July 2002 there were 68 SADC protocols in operation (SADC Protocols, 2002) and since then many more have been signed, the most recent being the Electoral Guidelines of 2004. As (Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004, p. 1) aptly observes, "while treaties and protocols have been signed, there is a limited history of common action and collective policy formulation"; the execution and outcomes of the

DRC and Lesotho debacles are still being debated. Some of the signed protocols have not yet been ratified and tentative – if not hesitant – steps have been taken towards the successive stages of complete integration. Until economic union is achieved, collective policy formulation would be difficult to implement.

Indeed Africa's newest regional grouping, SADC, is in many respects lagging behind the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Common Market for East and Southern African States (COMESA). For instance, in the former citizens of member states are issued visas at entry points, thus facilitating free movement of labour and capital, which in turn strengthens regional integration. COMESA has made significant progress in facilitating inter-regional trade, though, as with SADC, much still has to be done.

There are a number of factors that present considerable challenges to the quest for regional integration and common action in Southern Africa. Among these are: nationalist rivalry; incompatible political and economic systems; mono-cultural agro-based economies; unjust international economic structures; debt and dependency on the West; lack of infrastructure, financial and technical resources; the uneven distribution of the benefits of integration; multiple membership to regional organizations; poor economic and political governance; institutional incapacity; lack of grassroots support; rapid population growth; and slow economic growth. Compounding these difficulties is the failure to adequately address certain 'conceptual, strategic and practical problems' by SADC (Davies, 1996), which has led to lack of commitment and political will.

NATIONALIST RIVALRY

The pursuit of national interests has been the major obstacle to regional political integration. Often SADC member states pursue policies that promote their interests at the expense of other members; parochial interests of the ruling elite, have often prevailed over the interests of the masses of the region. This contradicts the spirit of co-operation and unity that SADC espouses and it hampers the development of common values. Even more serious, virulent nationalism undermines Pan-Africanism, a noble idea that seeks to unite Africans and which is the underlying ideology informing regional integration and the broader African Union (AU) project of building peace, security and development on the continent. Ideally, SADC should be a vehicle for achieving the ideals of African Union (AU) and NEPAD.

It is claimed strong bonds of solidarity forged through struggle against racial domination have contributed to "the formation of a distinct Southern African personality and that underpins political and economic co-operation". Rising xenophobia, riding on the back of nationalist ideology, in Botswana and South Africa for example belies this notion of 'a Southern African personality', a

claim that also smacks of essentialist stereotyping; the harassment and even murder, of African foreigners, especially Zimbabweans, in SA by xenophobic South Africans clearly demonstrates the challenges of building African unity at grassroots level. Not only is the celebration of nationalism likely to cause more hostility than unity between and among the countries and peoples of the sub-region, but it also leads to incompatible policies which are difficult to harmonize. For as long as nationalism, a more divisive than unifying ideology, remains the driving force behind regional integration initiatives, progress will be limited.

Nathan (2003; 3) identifies three factors that, by inhibiting the development of the Organ, have prevented SADC from playing a useful peacemaking role. First, and most important, "there is an absence of common values among member states, between democratic and authoritarian states and between pacifist and militarist foreign policy orientated states". The second major problem is that SADC states are loathe to surrendering a measure of sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and the possibility of intervention in domestic affairs. This reluctance stems from the political weaknesses of states and the lack of common values, mutual trust and a shared vision of the regime. The third critical problem is that the region is characterized by small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity which undermine the effectiveness of all SADC's forums and programmes.

INCOMPATIBLE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Regional integration presupposes complementary economic policies and productive structures. Yet SADC national economies are not complementary, but are instead structured in ways that promote competition for Western markets and investment. For example, Mozambique produces cashew and cotton, while Zimbabwe also produces cotton and tobacco, yet their greatest need now is technology, computers, cars and other manufactured goods, which neither produces. Similarly, Angola, Botswana and the DRC all produce diamond, yet neither of them can even process it nor manufacture the machinery to mine the diamond. Although SA represents a very important market for members' imports and exports, intra-regional trade between other SADC members is minimal.

Incompatible political and economic systems as well as the apparent disjuncture between the superstructure and substructure, complicate the challenges of integration. At independence the countries of the sub-region adopted different ideological systems – 'isms and schisms' – ranging from Tanzania's 'African socialism', Zambia's 'Humanism', Mozambique's 'Socialism with a Mozambican face' to South Africa's 'rainbow nation'. Although after the Cold War the former socialist countries have been forced to change

ideological direction and embrace neo-liberalism, residues of the old systems are still evident in many areas of life, including in policy formulation and implementation.

These differences in political and economic systems have translated into differences in economic performance as well as in relations with the rest of the world. Thus, for example, Botswana, a liberal economy, has become the West's darling while Zimbabwe, the new pariah. As Nathan (2003; 3) notes; "In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve or transcend their major disputes, achieve cohesion and act with common purpose in crisis situations". The incompatibility of political and economic systems is compounded by the nature of the sub-region's economies, which are mostly mono-cultural and agro-based.

MONO-CULTURAL AGRO-BASED ECONOMIES

With the exception of SA, the SADC national economies are largely monolithic, produce mainly raw materials and have an urban-rural duality, with the two sectors not quite integrated. Partly as an enduring legacy of colonialism and partly as a result of lack of vision by the political leadership, SADC countries continue to produce raw materials for export to their former colonial powers. Inserted into the global economic structures primarily as producers of raw materials and producing more or less the same raw goods, and in need of more or less the same manufactured goods makes intra-regional trade, a necessary condition for integration, impossible.

SADC states have sought to maximize benefits within this status quo, that is, to get favourable terms of trade with the West, for example through the Lome Convention. Although bilateral relations with developed countries ensure favourable treatment, they undermine regional collective interests which should be best served through multilateral agreements. Indeed vertical integration of SADC countries with their former colonial masters are being entrenched, while the touted horizontal regional integration is becoming a chimera. Competition among SADC member states for markets in the West can only entrench the dependency of these countries on their former colonial powers.

DEBT AND DEPENDENCY

Debt remains one of the biggest obstacles to regional integration, yet borrowing is necessary in order to pull the sub-region from the debt trap (Afrodad Research Series, 2004). South Africa has \$25 billion in foreign debt, of which \$11.7 billion is traceable to the apartheid era (Jubilee, 2000). Angola's owes about \$10 billion to countries that were involved in the Cold War, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) owes about \$2 billion (Jubilee, 2000). Mozambique owes about \$5.5 billion, and it pays about \$56 million to foreign creditors per annum (Minter, 2004). Malawi's external debt com-

mitment stands at about \$2.3 billion, while Zambia's is about \$7.1 billion. Mired in economic crisis of considerable proportions and a galloping inflation of nearly 2000%, Zimbabwe's debt commitment is estimated at about \$5 billion (<http://africa.iafrica.com/countryinfo/zimbabwe/economy/>)

. With an external debt of \$159 million Namibia's debt levels seem to be tolerable and well below the international benchmark of 60% of the GDP. According to 1997 figures, Botswana has a \$610 million external debt commitment, which is manageable given its diamonds and a small population. For most of these countries their debt service ratio is quite precarious, for example for war-time Mozambique it was about 70 per cent of GDP.

Dependent capitalism, which is the dominant ideological and economic framework for development within SADC, entails pursuit of self-interest over and above community interests, possessive individualism as opposed to collectivism and competition as against cooperation. Although some SADC countries had adopted socialism as their development ideology, this position became untenable after the end of the Cold-War and now capital accumulation is the name of the game. Not only do capitalist values of competition undermine the SADC spirit of co-operation, but also the inevitable polarisation in wealth makes integration even more difficult. Most SADC states are aid dependent and, in fact, five of these are Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

UNJUST INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES

Integration entails co-operating and establishing horizontal economic linkages with one another. However, the structure of the regional political economies dictates competition and vertical (North-South) linkages. As during the backwash epochs of slavery and colonialism, the North's interest in Africa is predicated on the need for access to raw materials and markets for manufactured products. Through manipulation of the international trading system by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), raw agricultural and mineral products are bought at low prices determined by the North (buyers), processed and sold back to the South at higher prices also determined by the North (sellers). This leads to deterioration in terms of trade and balance of payments deficits, debt and dependency.

Even more damaging, the vertical integration of various sectors of the SADC economies into economies of the North leads to fragmentation of SADC economies. The real problem here is the fact that the key players in the SADC economies are subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), which are based in the north. Rooted in the north, but operating in the South and motivated primarily by the profit motive, the MNCs can only

exacerbate the North-South divide. In other words, MNCs will pursue investment policies that reflect the needs and interests of their home countries and governments, which often provide them with protection when they quarrel with their host governments.

UNEVEN BENEFITS OF INTEGRATION

Typically SADC countries have acute differences in the sizes of their economies and levels of socio-political and economic development. This poses problems for rapid regional integration. South Africa has the most highly advanced economy in the region, while Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho have the least developed economies. The huge material difference in economic power and capacity means that the more powerful partner will tend to reap off more benefits in any interaction with the weaker partner. In a context of economic crisis, the fear of 'free riders' benefiting more hampers cooperation and progress in integration.

The de-industrialisation in a few SADC countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia over the last decade (SADC, 2003) has further reduced prospects for regional trade. As in Europe, capital expansion and investment as well equitable distribution of benefits of integration are essential in speeding up the process of economic integration. One pernicious consequence of the nationalist drive to maximise gain is membership to multiple regional agreements, which often have overlapping mandates and different to approaches to regional integration.

MULTIPLE MEMBERSHIPS TO RECS

Multiple memberships to Regional Economic Communities (RECs), not only create confusion, competition and duplication, but also constitute a burden on the taxpayer. As the SADC deputy executive secretary, Muchanga, acknowledged, "The overlapping of mandates does put pressure on countries to meet their obligations and this could also send confusing signals to donors". South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are members of both SACU and SADC, while Namibia and Swaziland hold both memberships of three regional integration agreements and they are part of the Common Monetary Area (which includes SA and Lesotho) and also participate in the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF) (Mutai, 2003; p. 6). In fact, a majority of SADC member states are also members of the Community of Eastern African and Southern African States (COMESA); this will cause problems when the region forms a Customs Union, as no country can belong to two unions.

Differences in approaches to integration add to the confusion and inconsistency and incoherence in policies. COMESA, for instance, is informed by classical Vinerian thinking and stresses the benefits of integration derived

from the removal of trade and non-tariff barriers. In contrast, SADC, whose history is rooted in the desire of economic independence and political security needs, favours a developmental approach to integration, which stresses sectoral cooperation. In short, multiple memberships are costly and inefficient, and this partly explains the limited capacity and success of both COMESA and SADC.

LACK OF GRASSROOTS SUPPORT

The major weakness of the institutional framework for political integration is that it overlooks the strategic importance of civil society and industry in regional integration and development. Not only does civil society promote human rights, which are endangered in a few SADC countries, but it is also an essential watchdog of governments. Yet in some SADC countries, civil society is seen with suspicion and often subjected to 'brutal discipline' while conditions for the flourishing of industry, innovation and prosperity are non-existent.

In virtually all SADC countries there are groups of people who are not well integrated into their families, communities, countries let alone region; many, overwhelmed by poverty and powerlessness, are personally disintegrating. So who is integrating, the leaders or the masses, states or their citizens? Does the SADC project speak to and for, the ordinary people of the region, such as informal traders, the street people of Cape Town, the Basarwa of Botswana, the Herero of Namibia and the homeless and landless in Zimbabwe? In what ways do these people benefit from the many SADC protocols, summits and agreements? How many of them know of SADC in the first place?

Highlighting the gap between the masses and the elite, only 31% of 600 people randomly interviewed in Cape Town knew of SADC. However, after goals of SADC were explained to them, 81% of the interviewees thought that SA would benefit from integration within SADC. The street people, the informal settlements dwellers, the landless and homeless are in desperate need of personal and community integration.

In Zimbabwe, the land reform and 'Operation Murambatsvina' may also have contributed to economic, family and community disintegration. Similarly, in Botswana, the San rework sentence through progress in the form of diamond mining and tourism, instead of being integrated with dignity, are enduring dispossession, dehumanisation and inevitable 'extinction'; their wisdom of co-existing with nature healthily is desperately needed if total environmental genocide is to be averted.

Coloureds, Indians and Whites constitute another significant minorities that, by self-exclusion from politics and public affairs, are not fully integrated in independent Southern Africa. Except in the putative rainbow nation of SA, these minority groups are conspicuously absent in

the police, public service and security forces of the states in the region. Though no doubt (many would have serious doubts about this assertion!) the new farmer has been rehabilitated and re-integrated in the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, for example, the previous farm owners and their workers have been dislocated, and even traumatised. As (Taylor, 1989; Killick, 1990) argue, political integration requires both bureaucratic and participatory decision-making. Yet, with the masses only participating in politics during the elections, SADC represents elite solidarity. The gap between the elite and the masses and the lack of grassroots support weakens the integration process.

POOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

SADC still faces major developmental challenges, which have been exacerbated by poor economic and political governance as well as by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Judged by its overall objective of poverty eradication, growth and economic development through cooperation and integration, SADC is a dismal failure. Poverty and unemployment are increasing and remain the defining features of the regional political economies. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing and with galloping inflation as Zimbabwe (estimated to be at about 1.5 million per cent), certain cherished beliefs and ideologies are collapsing under the weight of their contradictions. 'Performative contradictions' have become the order of the day and contributing to poor governance and consequently confusion and disillusionment. Unless good governance is established and civil society is strengthened, economic integration, characterized by increased regional trade, removal of trade barriers and import tariffs, freedom of movement of capital and labour, among others, will remain a distant reality.

DISAFFECTED STAKEHOLDERS

While regional integration is no doubt a noble cause, it causes disaffection to certain important stakeholders, at least in the short run. Immigration officials, the police and other state security organs are often hesitant to radically embrace the doctrine of integration, as they fear this may bring an influx of unwanted people, especially criminals. In the prevailing economic crisis in the sub-region, relaxing South African immigration rules, for instance, would result in increased troubles for SA as smugglers, drug dealers, illegal immigrants and economic and political refugees flock into the country. Not only will trying to contain and accommodate the foreigners strain state resources, but the foreigners will also compete with locals for jobs, thereby contributing to local unemployment.

Migrant workers, especially illegal ones, present serious dilemmas for the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On the one hand, and in line with the quest for 'uniting workers of the world', COSATU endeavours to accommodate and protect these workers. Yet on the other hand these workers' preparedness to accept lower wages undermines the COSATU's bargaining power and hence capacity to improve working conditions. Thus, for such stakeholders regional integration may be desirable but problematic in its ramifications. Yet for other sectors, such as the tourism industry for instance, the obvious benefits of integration may outweigh the problems associated with it.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The Cold War had reduced certain Southern African countries, Angola and Mozambique in particular, into battlegrounds of the East-West conflict. Its end, and the subsequent emergence of a put better phrase here, has created new challenges and threats, especially to weak states. The war on terrorism, for example, has not only diverted development aid from Africa, but has also led to new strategic alliances between certain African countries and the US. Such alliances may lead to suspicion among members of a REC and consequently the fragmentation of the integration project.

Similarly, the perceived instability of a uni-polar, multi-polar or non-polar world awkward and confusing and the resurgent terrorist threat have increased SADC states' propensity to purchase armaments. Purchasing arms and investing in defence not only denies the poor access to essentials like food, health care and education, but also leads to mistrust and to an arms race in the sub-region. In short, the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era are destabilizing and hinder regional integration.

GLOBALISATION AND ITS AMBIGUITIES

As a process that entails simultaneous integration and disintegration, globalisation- throughout doc standardize spellings according to AJPSIR's style can also undermine regional integration. First, market fundamentalism and hot pursuit of profit rephrase so that meaning is clear – write directly and simply, clarity is the paramount concern can contribute to the disintegration of local economies, environmental degradation and increased marginalization of weaker nations in the international political economy. Local economies collapse as a result of fierce competition from multinational companies, whose quest for profits is blind to environmental destruction, especially in the Third World (outdated term – consider alternatives like Global South) where regulatory capacities are weak.

Second, a small minority in the West (spelling and style are not consistent in doc. – West is correct, but "west" is

used in some parts of doc.) controls the technologies of globalization and the media, and this entrenches dependency on the West, while its media keeps painting a gloomy and negative picture of Africa in general and certain African countries in particular. Third, and related, globalization is seen by its critics as nothing more than a 'Macdonaldization' (check spelling and cite Ritzer) or Americanization of the world, a form of cultural imperialism that must be resisted. Thus globalization may lead to the increased marginalization of Southern Africa, increased violence and hence compound the difficulties of regional integration. The challenge is to devise strategies that optimize the benefits of globalization, while minimising its negative effects.

PARADIGMS AND MODELS OF INTEGRATION

Theoretically, the project of integration raises a number of questions, which if unanticipated may compromise the success of the project. In particular, competing paradigms and theories of integration confuse policy makers, whose assumptions about regional integration have been contradicted by the reality on the ground. For instance, the functionalist assumptions informing SADC philosophy and strategy are in sharp contrast with the dysfunctional nature of the regional economies.

Functionalism –a discredited, outdated model in social science. Also, consider systems theory-assumes that units within a system will perform specific 'functions' in order for the whole system to function properly. But the problem with SADC is that, as evidenced by the sectoral division of functions for each country, the units are dysfunctional, and hence the whole is also struggling to function properly, preceding unclear/awkward sents. Need reworking and elimination of repetitive and circular use of "function" Similarly, the stated developmental objectives of SADC are sharply contradicted by the logic of capitalism. Not surprisingly, very little has been achieved. As Nathan (2004; 3) aptly puts it: "The capacity and orientation of a regional organization derive from the capacity and orientation of its members". In SADC, both the orientation and capacity are quite problematic; not only is there lack of capacity, but there is also great variation in policy and systems orientation. In a nutshell, the difficulties of translating ideals into reality and of implementing protocols have led to 'performative contradictions' by politicians as they practice the opposite of what they preach, 'talking tough and acting soft' on regional integration.

WHAT HAS TO BE DONE?

The SADC region is emerging from several decades of political unrest, military confrontations and economic decline, whose ramifications would be felt for some time

to come; the DRC, a new member, is still mired in violence and instability. This history and the dynamics of globalization provide the context within which SADC's limited success has to be understood. First and foremost, achieving SADC objectives rests on the political will of political leaders (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995), the involvement of masses, and upon a combination of astute economic, social and political institutional engineering. There is need for a dialogue between civil society and governments, a dialogue that should result in mutual reinforcement and enhanced trust. Similarly, governments should create conditions for industry to flourish. This can be done, for example, by enacting effective rules to regulate and give incentives to corporate business, while in its turn business generates growth and creates employment. In short, the latent process of integration, which is driven by civil society and industry, needs to find expression in official discourses and documents.

Second and related, there is need for a fundamental change in development strategy and a transformation of SADC economies from being mere producers of raw materials and passive consumers of manufactured goods into dynamic and industrially diversified economies. Central to this project of industrial development and diversification, is more investment in, and mainstreaming of, research and development (R&D). As compared to the rest of the world, Africa devotes a rather dismally small proportion of its GDP to R&D. Leading the continent in R&D is SA, whose gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP grew from 0.71% in 2001/2 to 0.81% in 2003/4, and which is expected to reach a target of 1% by 2008 (Department of Science and Technology, South Africa, 2004). Though high by African standards, this figure puts SA second from last on an international ranking of 14 countries; with 4.27% Sweden comes first, and at 0.41%, Argentina is last. That expected target is also below Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and EU countries' average. Investment in R&D by governments, business and the non-profit sector is essential in enhancing the capacity for development, transformation and regional integration. In the informational era that we now live in, R&D, in its broad spectrum of basic research, pure basic research and strategic basic research, has become the most important tool for innovative and effective responses to the many challenges facing humanity. The production of knowledge, its dissemination and application is now the main driving force behind historical change and development.

The benefits of R&D are too many to list: the brain drain to the West could be curtailed; SADC can develop appropriate and environment friendly technologies; build a dynamic comparative advantage, in ICT for instance; it will possible to more effectively tap on the scientific, technological and financial potential of the Southern Africa's Diaspora community. Without downplaying the

importance of food security, to insist that agriculture remains the backbone of the economy in the informational era of the 21st century, not only condemns Africa to be the ghetto of the world, but also reflects monumental lack of vision. In short, it is through investment in R&D that SADC can only free itself from the yoke of dependency on the North and embark successfully on the project of people-oriented integration.

Third, the sub-region needs to strategically reposition itself so as to optimise the benefits of globalization. Globalization, as a process riding on the back of technology, presents a number of opportunities for regional integration. The revolution in communication, information and transport technologies has created unprecedented opportunities for the peoples of Southern Africa to enjoy certain freedoms that were unthinkable of a few decades ago. For example, the advent of the cellular telephone means that people can be connected even when travelling, which has become much more comfortable, easier and faster. Globalization, and especially through the easy availability of certain technologies which, for example, enhance the freedom of movement of capital and labour, can facilitate regional integration.

Through the media, TVs, newspapers and radio, globalization promotes awareness of world events by the sub-region's people, and this can help create a sense of solidarity and an information society. Third, globalization has also opened up political space for democratic engagement. This should encourage the peoples of Southern Africa to democratically debate the nature and form of integration appropriate for their situation and time. In its present institutional and bureaucratic form SADC seems not quite well structured to benefit from globalisation. Finally, there is need for clarity on the paradigms, values and theories guiding integration.

SUMMARY

Nearly three decades after SADC's formation, the misery of the people of Southern Africa has not diminished. The increasing pauperisation of the sub-region's peoples is damning evidence of SADC's failure to achieve its stated objectives of economic and social development through regional integration and co-operation. It is now important to ask the right questions first, and to understand the implications for theory and policy. Getting priorities right is perhaps the first essential step in efforts at successful integration. As the ECA 2003 (xi) report notes, "success in accelerating the pace of development will come to countries that maintain fiscal discipline, address deep pockets of poverty, provide opportunities for private entrepreneurs to flourish, and modernize their bureaucracies". Investing in R&D and human resources is critical, as it enables the regions' nations to accelerate growth through environment friendly industrialization.

For regional integration to succeed, not only must national economic and political systems be in good

working order, but they must also be compatible. It is necessary to clean up the internal mess - before trying to share it with others - and to align the political systems with one another. Similarly, member states need to transform the productive structures of their economies and limit dependence on primary commodities. This should involve diversifying their production base through investing in R&D and redressing the supply side of their economies. Convergence of economic policy of member states in an environment free from external influence, for example by the IMF and the World Bank, is necessary if nationalist rivalry is to be curbed. Decisions at a national level must be compatible with objectives of regional integration, and national foreign policy should transcend the "personal idiosyncrasy of and disagreements between national leaders" (Taylor, 1990).

The genuine concerns of some stakeholders, such as COSATU and the South African immigration and police, need to be taken into account. Mobilising the Diaspora could help alleviate human resources shortages and reverse the impact of the brain drain. Although the RISDP recognizes the strategic importance of civil society and industry, there remains a debilitating mutual distrust and contempt between civil society and industry on the one hand, and governments and regional organizations on the other. Perhaps a dialogue in each member state on the goals of regional integration between the ruling elites and the masses will help raise awareness and support for regional integration.

One of the biggest challenges facing SADC countries is devising policies that generate sustainable long-term economic growth. As the 2003 ECA report (xi) point out:

First sound economic governance creates an environment that encourages private individuals and groups to take risks, invest capital and export. Second, governance is the result of strong public institutions - including the bureaucracy essential for policy formulation and implementation...only sound governance can stop poverty from becoming entrenched, investment from dwindling, chronic fiscal deficits from draining and then driving away international resources and precious human resources from fleeing a country.

Progress presupposes improvement in economic and political governance, and assurances that benefits from integration will be equally distributed. Similarly, national policies need to be homogenised and to compliment each other, and for this to happen leaders must muster enough political will to implement policies.

In spite of persistent problems, a number of positive developments have been recorded in the region. The first major achievement is that strategically important countries in the SADC region - Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and most importantly South Africa - have undergone democratic transitions from authoritarian colonial rule. These transitions have brought relative peace and stability in the region, this is a problematic assertion given the continued (after independence) fighting in Angola, Mozambique and

turmoil in Zimb. etc. statement needs more nuance both fundamental conditions for development and integration as well as for the restructuring of SADC institutions. Increased peace and knowledge enjoyed by future generations will allow the integration and enlightenment project in Southern Africa to triumph. Rephrase/rework sent.

Conclusion

This analysis has critically reviewed the fortunes of the peoples of Southern Africa under the regional integration project. Although democratic deficits exist in a few countries, progress has been made, for example, in establishing OPDS, the SADC long-term development blueprint, the RISDP and SADC National Committees. The achievement of peace and democratic transitions in Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa in the 1990s and Angola in 2002 have had positive regional outcomes. To its credit, SADC has adopted the RISDP as both a blueprint and vehicle for regional integration that envisages the creation by 2008 of, a free trade area, a customs union by 2012 and a common market by 2015. In the peace and security sphere, SADC has also signed the Protocol that gave birth to its security arm, the OPDS. Debt and dependency on the West, monolithic and dualistic economies, parochial economic nationalism, and competition for western favours make effective economic integration enormously difficult. SADC also suffers from institutional incapacity, lacks human and financial resources; this often causes states to be inward looking as they are dogged with internal problems. The varying degrees of economic development of SADC countries make homogenising domestic policies difficult. In addition, some SADC economies are too weak and have limited resources to contribute towards the regional project. Some member states have multiple membership to regional agreements, which increases the burden on the taxpayer and entail costly duplication of tasks. The wide gap between the elite and masses and the lack of grassroots knowledge and support of the goals of SADC also hamper integration.

In conclusion, although progress has been made in some areas, overall the stalled transitions and transformations have generated frustration and resentment. The theoretical questions that regional integration has given rise to are perennial and relevant in Southern Africa today. A strategy for SADC integration should seek to grasp the necessary conditions for this possibility, a possibility that would give the people of the region their best chance of living satisfying, creative, generous lives characterised by pleasure and wisdom. In the era globalisation, that possibility seems to reside in a rejection of orthodox economic development models, a dynamic and effective embrace of science and technology and investment in R & D as well as in people. Integrating disparate and disarticulated economies is a

feat.

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